One simple question, one radical consequence: where does experience exist?
My work brings together philosophy of mind, robotics, cognitive science, media and art around Mind-Object Identity: the hypothesis that experience is not an internal copy of the world, but the object itself in its existence relative to the body.
From perception to reality.
The starting point is an objection to the dominant paradigm: if the brain produces a representation of the object, what accounts for the object of experience? MOI replaces the relation among object, brain and representation with an identity: experience is the physical object that exists relative to a body.
This hypothesis makes it possible to rethink perception, dreams, hallucinations, imagination, personal identity and artificial intelligence without reintroducing a mental world separate from the physical world.
Philosophy of consciousness
Mind-Object Identity, critique of representationalism, the hard problem, perception and the transparency of experience.
Artificial intelligence
LLMs, machine consciousness, creativity, agency and the difference between manipulating symbols and meeting the world.
Media, images and art
Technical objects and images as ways of accessing reality; aesthetics and the psychology of art as a laboratory for MOI.
Freedom and value
Choice, responsibility for ends and human value in the age of cognitive automation.
For readers, students and researchers.
The Spread Mind
OR Books, 2017. The first international presentation of Mind-Object Identity.
Consciousness and Object
John Benjamins, 2018. The systematic and technical formulation of the theory.
La mente allargata
Il Saggiatore, 2019. An Italian introduction to consciousness as world.
Dialogues on Consciousness, with Tim Parks
OR Books, 2018. Fifteen conversations across philosophy, literature and cognitive science.
For seminars, collaborations and academic material.
For CVs, publications, research seminars, supervision or university invitations, contact me directly.
Write to my university address →